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Abstract
We present a general analysis of multidimensional matching
problems with transferable utility, paying particular attention to
the case in which the dimensions of heterogeneity on the two
sides of the market are unequal. A particular emphasis is put
on problems where agents on one side of the market are multidi-
mensional and agents on the other side are uni-dimensional; we
describe a general approach to solve such problems. Lastly, we
analyze several examples, including an hedonic model with dif-
ferentiated products, a marriage market model where wives are
differentiated in income and fertility, and a competitive variation
of the Rochet-Chone´ problem. In the latter example, we show
that the bunching phenomena, observed by Rochet and Chone´ in
the monopoly context, do not occur in the competitive context.
1 Introduction
Matching problems under transferable utility have attracted consider-
able attention in recent years within economic theory. The general goal
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is to understand the stable equilibria of matches between distributions
of agents on two sides of a ‘market’ (for example, husbands and wives
in the marriage market, CEOs and firms in the labor market, produc-
ers and consumers in a market for differentiated commodities, etc.), as
well as the resulting division of surplus between partners. Until recently,
most work has focused on the setting in which a single characteristic is
used to distinguish between the agents on each side; for example, in the
marriage market, several models assume that individuals differ only by
their income (or their human capital). These models have the advan-
tage of being analytically tractable, and often allow explicit closed form
solutions. Under the classical Spence-Mirrlees condition, the only stable
matching is the positive assortative one, the nature of which (‘who mar-
ries whom’) is directly determined by the underlying distributions of the
male and female characteristic. However, these one dimensional models
are unsatisfactory in many situations, as both casual empiricism and
factual evidence indicate that agents often match on several traits. In
the marriage market, for instance, the suitability of a potential marriage
between a woman and man typically depends on several characteristics
of both, including income and education, but also age, tastes, ethnic
background, physical attractiveness, etc.
It is therefore important to study and understand multidimensional
matching problems, in which agents on both side of the market are dif-
ferentiated using several characteristics. These models have garnered
increasing visibility in recent years, due to their wider applicability and
flexibility, but their introduction brings forth serious theoretical chal-
lenges. The nature of the equilibrium matching is more interesting but
also more complex; in contrast to the one dimensional case, it is no
longer determined by the sole knowledge of the distributions of individ-
ual characteristics, even under (a generalization of) the Spence-Mirrlees
condition. From a more technical perspective, it is generally not possi-
ble to derive closed form solutions; and discretising matching problems
leads to a linear program, which often become numerically unwieldy
when type spaces are multidimensional.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a general characterization
of multidimensional matching models, in terms of existence, unique-
ness and qualitative properties of stable matches. Since the work of
[Shapley & Shubik (1971)] in the discrete setting, and [Gretsky, Ostroy & Zame (1992)]
in the continuum, it has been understood that transferable utility match-
ing is equivalent to a variational problem; this problem is known in
the mathematics literature as the Monge-Kantorovich optimal transport
problem. Our first goal is to show that the considerable existing litera-
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ture on multidimensional optimal transport1 can be exploited to derive
conditions under which stable matches are unique and pure, and to un-
derstand their properties.
We put a particular emphasis on the case in which the dimensions of
heterogeneity on the two sides of the market are unequal (say, m > n).
These sorts of problems have received relatively little attention from
the mathematics community, but are quite natural economically; the di-
mension essentially reflects the number of attributes used to distinguish
between agents and there is no compelling reason in general to expect
this number to coincide for agents on the two different sides of the mar-
ket (say, for consumers and producers). A typical pattern emerges in
these situations, since for one side of the market (the one with a lower
dimension), identical agents are typically matched with a continuum
of different partners. We explore the properties of the ‘indifference sets’
thus defined, and argue that since such indifference sets can often be em-
pirically recovered, these properties can provide testable consequences
of multidimensional matching theory.
Of specific interest are the so-called ‘multi-to-one dimensional match-
ing problems’, in which agents on one side of the market are assumed to
be multidimensional, while those on the other side are unidimensional.
They include an economically important class of examples (see, for in-
stance, [Chiappori, Oreffice & Quintana-Domeque (2012)] and [Low (2014)]),
for which one can obtain explicitly the stable matchings. In this con-
text, we describe a general approach aimed at characterizing the equi-
librium matching. We provide a robust methodology that allows, under
suitable conditions, to explicitly characterize its solutions. We discuss
some interesting features that the indifference sets exhibit, and which
are typically absent in purely unidimensional problems. For instance,
the optimal mapping may be discontinuous, and so women of similar
types may marry men of very different types.
Lastly, we consider three specific examples that illustrate different
potential applications of matching models. One is a standard, hedonic
model of the type used, in particular, in the empirical IO literature.
While these models typically assume imperfect competition, we show
how a competitive version can be analyzed. Under standard conditions,
existence, but also uniqueness and purity, obtain naturally. In particular,
we show that the mathematical notion of purity has in this context a
natural interpretation in terms of ‘bunching’. In addition, it is in general
possible, using matching or optimal transportations techniques, to derive
closed form solutions for the pricing schedule; we illustrate how this can
be done using specific distributions.
1For a general survey, see for instance [Villani (2009)] and [Santambrogio (2015)].
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Our second example considers a context where women are charac-
terized by two traits (socio-economic status, from now on SES, and
fertility) whereas men only differ by their SES - a case recently stud-
ied by [Low (2014)]. Then it may be the case that small changes in a
middle class woman’s SES (while her fertility remains constant) result
in a large change in her husband’s income. Again, we provide a gen-
eral characterization of the solution and describe some of its qualitative
features.
Lastly, the multi-to-one dimensional framework naturally leads to
investigating the relationship between matching models and principal-
agents problems under multidimensional asymmetric information. While
this general question remains widely open (and quite challenging), we
illustrate our contribution by considering a competitive variant of the
seminal model of [Rochet & Chone´ (1998)], in which goods can be pro-
duced by a competitive and 1-dimensionally heterogeneous set of produc-
ers, rather than a single monopolist. Unlike the original Rochet-Chone´
framework, this model is equivalent to a matching problem of our form,
and can be solved explicitly by the methods described above. We pro-
vide a full characterization of the resulting equilibrium price schedule. In
particular, we show that in our competitive framework, and in contrast
to the original monopolist setting, there is never bunching: consumers of
different types always buy goods with different characteristics. In other
words, the strange bunching patterns emphasized by Rochet and Chone´
do not appear to be intrinsically linked to the multidimensional nature
of the adverse selection problem; rather, they are due to the distorsions
created by the presence of a monopolist producer.
2 Multidimensional matching under transferable util-
ity: basic properties
2.1 General framework and basic results
2.1.1 The model
We consider sets X ⊆ Rm and Y ⊆ Rn, parametrizing populations of
agents on two sides of a market. In what follows, we shall stick to the
marriage market interpretation (so that X and Y will denote the set
of potential wives and husbands respectively), although alternative in-
terpretations are obviously possible. They are distributed according to
probability measures µ on X and ν on Y , respectively. In the trans-
ferable utility framework, a potential matching of agents x ∈ X and
y ∈ Y generates a combined surplus s(x, y), where s : X × Y → R.
This surplus can be divided in any way between the agents x and
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y. For simplicity, we assume that s and its derivatives are smooth
and bounded unless otherwise remarked; many of the results we de-
scribe can also be extended to surpluses with less smoothness, as in
[Chiappori, McCann & Nesheim (2010)] and [Noldeke & Samuelson (2015)]
for example.
A matching is characterized by a probability measure γ on the prod-
uct X × Y , whose marginals are µ and ν, that is
γ(A× Y ) = µ(A) and γ(X ×B) = ν(B) (1)
for all Borel A ⊂ X,B ⊂ Y . Intuitively, a matching is an assignment
of the agents in the sets X and Y into pairs, and γ (x, y) is related to
the probability that x will be matched to y; in particular, (x, y) /∈ spt γ2
implies that agents x and y are not matched together. The marginal
condition is often called the market clearing criterion. We denote the
set of all matchings by Γ(µ, ν).
Integrable functions u : X → R and v : Y → R are called payoff
functions corresponding to γ if they satisfy the budget constraint :
u(x) + v(y) ≤ s(x, y) (2)
γ almost everywhere — i.e., for any pair of agents who match with
positive probability. For such a pair (x, y) ∈ spt γ,the functions u(x)
and v(y) are interpreted respectively as the indirect utilities derived
from the match by agents x and y; the constraint (2) ensures that the
total indirect utility u(x) + v(y) collected by the two agents does not
exceed the total surplus s(x, y) available to them.
A matching γ is called stable if there exist payoff functions u(x) and
v(y) satisfying both (2) and the reverse inequality
u(x) + v(y)− s(x, y) ≥ 0 (3)
for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y . Condition (3) expresses the stability of the
matching in the following sense; if we had u(x) + v(y) < s(x, y) for any
(currently unmatched) pair of agents, it would be desirable for each of
them to leave their current partners and match together, dividing the
excess surplus s(x, y) − u(x) − v(y) > 0 in such a way as to increase
the payoffs to both x and y. Note that (2) and (3) together ensure
u(x) + v(y) = s(x, y), γ almost everywhere: if two agents match with
positive probability, then they split the surplus generated between them.
For simplicity, we shall assume complete participation is incentivized
throughout and that supply balances demand (reflected by the fact that
2Here spt γ refers to the support of γ, i.e. the smallest closed set containing the
full mass of γ.
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µ and ν have equal mass); when these assumptions are violated it is
well-known that they can be restored by augmenting both sides of the
market with a fictitious type representing the outside option of remaining
unmatched (see for instance [Chiappori, McCann & Nesheim (2010)]).
Given a stable match γ and associated matching functions u, v, the
set
S = {(x, y) ∈ X × Y | u(x) + v(y) = s(x, y)}
is of particular interest; as spt γ ⊂ S, it tells us which agents can match
together. If S is concentrated on a graph {(x, F (x)) | x ∈ S} of some
function F : X −→ Y , the stable matching is called pure, the interpre-
tation being that almost all agents of type x must match with agents of
the same type y = F (x); in particular, purity excludes the presence of
randomization, whereby an agent may be randomly assigned to different
partners. In this case, the distribution ν agrees with the image F#µ of
µ under F , which assigns mass
(F#µ)(V ) := µ[F
−1(V )] (4)
to each V ⊂ Y .3 More generally, it is interesting and useful to under-
stand the geometry of S.
Although u and v will not generally be everywhere differentiable,
some mild regularity condition guarantees differentiability almost every-
where, as stated by the following result:
Lemma 1 If the surplus function s is Lipschitz, so are the payoffs u and
v — and with the same Lipschitz constant; if s ∈ C2(X×Y ), then u and
v have second-order Taylor expansions, Lebesgue almost-everywhere.
Proof. See [Villani (2009)] or [Santambrogio (2015)].
When the probability measures µ and ν come from Lebesgue densi-
ties, this almost-everywhere differentiability proves sufficient for many
analytic purposes. We use DomDu (respectively DomD2u) to denote
those x ∈ X at which u has a first- (respectively second-)order Taylor
expansion, and Dom0D
iu :=
(
X
)0 ∩ DomDiu where X and X0 denote
the closure and interior of X, respectively.
The fact that S is the zero-set of the non-negative function (3) en-
ters crucially. It implies in particular the first-order and second order
conditions
(Du(x), Dv(y)) = (Dxs(x, y), Dys(x, y)) (5)
3Also called the push-forward F#µ of µ through F ; see e.g.
[Ahmad, Kim & McCann (2011)].
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and (
D2u(x) 0
0 D2v(y)
)
≥
(
D2xxs(x, y)D
2
xys(x, y)
D2yxs(x, y)D
2
yys(x, y)
)
(6)
are satisfied at each (x, y) ∈ S ∩ (X × Y )0 for which the derivatives
in question exist; here X0 denotes the interior of X, and inequality (6)
should be understood to mean the difference of these (m+n)× (m+n)
symmetric matrices is non-negative definite.
The first-order condition
Du(x) = Dxs(x, y) (7)
(for example) has an interesting, economic interpretation. In a trans-
ferability utility model, the wife’s share u(x) of the surplus comes at
the expense of her husband y’s share. Thus (7) expresses the equality
of his marginal willingness Du(x) to pay for variations in her qualities
x = (x1, . . . , xm) with the couple’s marginal surplus Dxs(x, y) for the
same variations. Similarly
Dv(y) = Dys(x, y) (8)
equates her marginal willingness to pay for variations in his qualities
y = (y1, . . . , yn) with their marginal surplus for such variations. This
has important consequences for situations where characteristics are not
exogenously given but result from some investment made by individuals
before the beginning of the game (human capital being an obvious ex-
ample). Then (7) implies that the marginal return, for the individual,
of an investment in characteristics is exactly equal to the social return
(defined as the contribution of the investment to aggregate surplus). In
other words, one expect that for some equilibria such investments will
be efficient, despite being made non-cooperatively before the match-
ing game; their impact on global welfare is internalized by matching
mechanisms, a point made by [Cole, Mailath & Postlewaite (2001)] and
[Iyigun & Walsh (2007)] and generalized by [Noldeke & Samuelson (2015)].
2.1.2 Variational interpretation: optimal transport and dual-
ity
The problem of identifying stable matches turns out to have a variational
formulation, known as the optimal transport, or Monge-Kantorovich,
problem in the mathematics literature (see for instance [Villani (2009)],
[Santambrogio (2015)] and [Galichon (2016)]). This is the problem of
matching the measures µ and ν so as the maximize the total surplus;
that is, to find γ among the set Γ(µ, ν) which maximizes
s[γ] :=
∫
X×Y
s(x, y)dγ(x, y). (MK)
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The following theorem can be traced back to [Shapley & Shubik (1971)]
for finite type spaces X and Y , and to [Gretsky, Ostroy & Zame (1992)]
more generally. It asserts an equivalence between (MK) and stable
matchings.
Theorem 2 A matching measure γ ∈ Γ(µ, ν) is stable if and only if it
maximizes (MK).
As the maximization of a linear functional over a convex set, problem
(MK) has a dual problem, which is useful both in studying it maximizers,
and in clarifying its relation with stable matching. The dual problem to
(MK) is to minimize
µ[u] + ν[v] :=
∫
X
u(x)dµ(x) +
∫
Y
v(y)dν(y). (MK∗)
among functions u ∈ L1(µ) and v ∈ L1(ν) satisfying the stability condi-
tion (3). It is well known that under mild conditions, duality holds (see,
for instance, [Villani (2009)]), that is:
max
γ satisfying (1)
s[γ] = min
(u,v) satisfying (3)
(
µ[u] + ν[v]
)
. (9)
Note that for any u and v satisfying the stability constraint (3) and any
matching γ ∈ Γ(µ, ν), the marginal condition implies
µ[u] + ν[v] =
∫
X×Y
(u(x) + v(y)) dγ(x, y) ≥
∫
X×Y
s(x, y)dγ(x, y)
and we can have equality if and only if u(x) + v(y) = s(x, y) holds γ-
almost everywhere. It then follows from the duality theorem that γ is a
maximizer in (MK) (and hence a stable match) and u, v are minimizers
in the dual problem (MK∗), precisely when u(x) + v(y) = s(x, y) holds
γ almost everywhere; in other words, the solutions to (MK∗) coincide
with the payoff functions.
An immediate corollary is the following:
Corollary 3 Let s and s¯ be two surplus functions. Assume there exists
two functions f and g, mapping Rm to R and Rn to R respectively, such
that
s (x, y) = s¯ (x, y) + f (x) + g (y)
For any measures µ and ν, any stable matching for s is a stable matching
for s¯ and conversely.
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Proof. Any stable measure γ for s solves the surplus maximization
problem:
max
γ satisfying (1)
∫
X×Y
s(x, y)dγ(x, y). (10)
which is equivalent to:
max
γ satisfying (1)
∫
X×Y
s¯(x, y)dγ(x, y) +
∫
X
f(x)dµ(x) +
∫
Y
g(y)dν(y)
The last two integrals are given (by the marginal conditions on γ), and
so any γ that solves (10) also solves (11):
max
γ satisfying (1)
∫
X×Y
s¯(x, y)dγ(x, y). (11)
An important consequence of this result is that the observation of
matching patterns can only (at best) identify the surplus up to two ad-
ditive functions of x and y respectively. We shall see later on that, in
general, s cannot be identified even up to two such additive functions.
Problem (MK) has been studied extensively over the past 25 years,
and Theorem 2 allows the application of a large resulting body of theory
to the stable matching problem. In particular, conditions on s leading to
existence, uniqueness and purity of the solution to (MK) are well known
and surveyed in [Villani (2009)]. These properties can be compactly
and elegantly expressed in terms of the cross difference, introduced by
[McCann (2014)] and defined on (X × Y )2 by:
δ(x, y, x0, y0) = s(x, y) + s(x0, y0)− s(x, y0)− s(x0, y)
The relevance of the cross difference to problem (MK) will become
more apparent in what follows. For now, we hint at its role by noting
that in one dimension, m = n = 1, positivity of the cross difference
whenever (x − x0) · (y − y0) > 0 is equivalent to supermodularity of s
(the Spence-Mirrlees condition). For more general X and Y , the cross
difference is zero along the diagonal {(x, y) = (x0, y0)} and nonnegative
along spt γ × spt γ ⊆ (X × Y )2 for any stable match γ. This non-
negativity of s on (spt γ)2 is typically referred to as s-monotonicity of
spt γ, and is a special case of a more general condition called s-cyclical
monotonicity, which characterizes the support of optimal matchings.
2.1.3 Existence, purity and uniqueness of a stable matching
The variational formulation is quite helpful in establishing the basic
properties of stable matchings. Existence, for instance, can now be as-
serted using basic continuity and compactness arguments, as stated by
the following result:
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Theorem 4 Assume X ⊂ Rm and Y ⊂ Rn are bounded and s ∈ C(X×
Y ). Then there exists an optimizer γ to (MK), and therefore a stable
match.
Proof. See [Villani (2009)] or [Santambrogio (2015)]
We now consider uniqueness and purity. Aside from its theoret-
ical interest, uniqueness of the optimal matching γ plays an impor-
tant computational role, as in its absence more sophisticated techniques
must be employed. In practice, solutions are often assumed to be pure
in empirical studies. Since this conclusion is not generically satisfied
[McCann & Rifford (2016)], it is desirable to know conditions on s, µ
and ν which guarantee it. Furthermore, in hedonic contexts, purity im-
plies the absence of ’bunching’ (whereby different agents consume the
same product); this property will be particularly important when we
investigate the interactions between matching and contract theory.
Note, first, that uniqueness is not guaranteed in general. For in-
stance, when the surplus function takes the additive form s(x, y) =
f(x) + g(y), the functional
s[γ] =
∫
X×Y
s(x, y)dγ(x, y) =
∫
X
f(x)dµ(x) +
∫
Y
g(y)dν(y)
is constant throughout the set Γ(µ, ν) of feasible matching measures, and
so any matching γ is optimal and hence stable. It is therefore clear that
certain structural conditions on s are indeed needed to ensure purity and
uniqueness.
The key condition for purity of the optimal matching is a nonlo-
cal generalization of the Spence-Mirrlees condition, known as the twist
condition:
Definition 5 The function s ∈ C1 satisfies the twist condition if, for
each fixed x0 ∈ X and y0 6= y ∈ Y , the mapping
x ∈ X 7→ δ(x, y, x0, y0) (12)
has no critical points.
By differentiating δ with respect to x and rearranging, we see that
this is equivalent to
Dxs(x, y) 6= Dxs(x, y0) (13)
for all x and distinct y 6= y0. The twist condition is therefore equivalent
to the injectivity of y 7→ Dxs(x, y), for each fixed x. This injectivity
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in turn implies that the husband type y of woman type x ∈ DomDu
is uniquely determined by his marginal willingness Du(x) to pay for
her qualities through the first-order condition (7). For instance, in a
one-dimensional context (m = 1 = n), the classical Spence-Mirrlees
condition imposes that either ∂
2s
∂x∂y
> 0 or ∂
2s
∂x∂y
< 0 over X × Y , which
implies that y 7→ ∂s
∂x
(x, y) is strictly monotone (and hence injective) for
each fixed x. It is in this sense that the twist condition can be viewed
as a non-local generalization of the Spence-Mirrlees condition.
The twist condition is sufficient to guarantee purity, as stated by the
following result:
Theorem 6 ([Gangbo (1995)], [Levin (1999)]) Assume that µ is ab-
solutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure and the surplus s
satisfies the twist condition. Then any solution γ to (MK) is pure.
Proof. Let γ solve (MK) for a twisted surplus s ∈ C1. According to
Theorems 1 and 2, there exist Lipschitz potentials u on X and v on Y
satisfying u(x) + v(y) ≥ s(x, y) for all (x, y) ∈ X × Y , with equality
holding γ-a.e. Being Lipschitz, u is differentiable Lebesgue almost ev-
erywhere, hence µ-a.e., where µ denotes the left marginal of γ. Thus
for µ-a.e. x we find Du(x) = Dxs(x, y) as in (5). The twist condi-
tion (12) implies we can invert this relation to write y = F (x), where
F (x) = [Dxs(x, ·)]−1(Du(x)). This shows γ is pure.
The absolute continuity of µ is a technical condition required to en-
sure the utilities can be differentiated on a set of full µ measure; the
payoff functions are guaranteed to be Lipschitz if the surplus is, and
are hence differentiable Lebesgue almost everywhere by Rademacher’s
theorem (but not everywhere in general). The condition on the measure
can be weakened somewhat, but some regularity is needed: as a simple
counterexample, if µ = δx0 is a Dirac mass but ν is not, then the opti-
mal matching (indeed, the only measure in Γ(µ, ν)) is product measure
δx0 ⊗ ν, which pairs every point y with x0 and is certainly not pure.
Three remarks can be made at this point. First, if s is twice contin-
uously differentiable and Y has nonempty interior, the twist condition
immediately implies that n ≤ m, as it asserts the existence of a smooth
injection (13) from an open subset of Rn into Rm. Second, it is worth
noting that in many relevant situations, the twist condition does indeed
fail; for example, if we replace X and Y with compact smooth manifolds,
it fails for any smooth surplus function s. Third, the twist condition is
not necessary for purity. For instance, [Kitagawa & Warren (2012)] pro-
vide a setting in which purity holds in the absence of twist.
One can readily see that purity implies uniqueness:
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Corollary 7 Under the conclusions of the preceding theorem, the opti-
mal matching γ is unique.
Proof. Suppose two solutions γ0 and γ1 to (MK) exist. Convexity of
the problem makes it clear that γ2 = (γ0 + γ1)/2 is again a solution.
The conclusion asserts that γ2 concentrates on the graph of a map F :
X −→ Y , and vanishes outside this graph. Non-negativity ensures the
same must be true for γ0 and γ1. But then γ0 = (F × id)#µ = γ1 by
Lemma 3.1 of [Ahmad, Kim & McCann (2011)]
The converse to this Corollary is not true; i.e., one can easily find
situations where the optimal matching is unique but not pure. Addi-
tional conditions which ensure uniqueness, but not purity, of the optimal
matching can be found in [Chiappori, McCann & Nesheim (2010)] and
[McCann & Rifford (2016)].
2.1.4 An example
As an illustration of Theorem 6, we consider a particular case that has
been widely used in empirical applications ([Galichon & Salanie´ (2012)],
[Dupuy & Galichon(2014)], [Lindenlaub (2015)] to name just a few). As-
sume that m = n, and that the surplus takes the form:
s (x, y) = fX (x) + gY (y) +
n∑
k=1
fk (xk) gk (yk)
Two remarks can be made about this form. First, we may, without
loss of generality, disregard the first two terms by assuming that fX =
gY = 0; the stable measure will not be affected. Second, this form is
necessary and sufficient for the matrix of cross derivatives:
D2xys =
((
∂2s
∂xk∂yl
))
to be diagonal (a case investigated by [Lindenlaub (2015)]).
In that case, for any y 6= y¯, we have that:
Dxs (x, y)−Dxs (x, y¯) =
 f
′
1 (x1) (g1 (y1)− g1 (y¯1))
...
f ′n (xn) (gn (yn)− gn (y¯n))

In particular (and assuming that none of the fi’s have anywhere van-
ishing derivatives), the twist condition is satisfied whenever the gi’s are
strictly monotonic. We conclude that, in that case, the stable match is
unique and pure; that is, there exists a function F mapping Rm to itself,
such that x is matched a.s. with y = (F1 (x) , ..., Fm (x)). In addition,
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[Lindenlaub (2015)] show that if the f and g are strictly increasing, then
Fi is strictly increasing in xi for all i (a property she calls multidimen-
sional positive assortative matching).
2.1.5 Local structure of the optimal matching
In the absence of the twist condition, or in the case where both marginals
are singular, one may not expect purity of the optimal match. However,
under a generic nondegeneracy criterion, which is a local generaliza-
tion of the Spence-Mirrlees condition, something can be still be asserted
about the local geometric structure of its support. For a fixed (x0, y0),
let H be the Hessian of the function (x, y) 7→ δ(x, y, x0, y0), evaluated at
the point (x, y) = (x0, y0). A simple calculation yields that H takes the
block form:
H =
[
0 D2xys
D2yxs 0
]
where
D2xys = (
∂2s
∂xiyj
)ij
is the m×n matrix of mixed second order partials, and the 0’s in the up-
per left and lower right hand corners represent m×m and n×n vanishing
blocks, respectively. Denoting by r the rank of D2xys, we have the follow-
ing theorem (see [McCann, Pass & Warren (2012)] and [Pass (2012a)]).
Theorem 8 There exists a neighborhood N of (x0, y0) such that the
intersection N ∩ S is contained in a Lipschitz submanifold of X × Y of
dimension m+ n− r. At points where S is differentiable it is spacelike
in the sense that H(v, v) ≥ 0 for any v which is tangent to the set S.
In particular, in the special case where m = n and H has full rank,
r = n, the support is at most m = n dimensional (locally). When these
dimensions differ, and the n×m matrix has full rank r = min(n,m), the
dimension is max(n,m) and its codimension is min(n,m) [Pass (2012a)].
If r = min(n,m) we say s is non-degenerate at (x0, y0).
The spacelike assertion of Theorem 8 can be useful to identify the
orientation of the optimal matching, as we will see below.
Example 9 When m = n = 1, assuming the Spence-Mirrlees condi-
tion ∂
2s
∂x∂y
> 0, the theorem tells us that the solution concentrates on a
1-dimensional Lipschitz curve (x(t), y(t)). Wherever that curve is dif-
ferentiable, the spacelike condition boils down to x′(t) ∂
2s
∂x∂y
y′(t) ≥ 0, or
x′(t)y′(t) ≥ 0, yielding positive assortative matching. There is only one
matching γ with this structure, and it can be computed explicitly from
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the measures µ and ν (provided µ has no atoms); it is given by F#µ
where F : X → Y satisfies∫
(−∞,F (x))
dν ≤
∫ x
−∞
dµ ≤
∫
(−∞,F (x)]
dν
In words: x is matched with y = F (x) such that the number of women
whose characteristic is larger than x equals the number of men above y.
2.1.6 Regularity (smoothness) of the matching function
When s satisfies the twist condition, and the optimal matching is there-
fore pure and unique, it is interesting to ask whether the mapping
F : X → Y generating the matching is continuous; qualitatively, this is
the question of whether women x and x′ whose types are ‘close’ must
marry men of similar characteristics.
This turns out to generally not be the case, as a wide range of exam-
ples throughout the literature on optimal transport show. In particular,
as was shown by [Ma, Trudinger & Wang (2005)], it is necessary (but
not sufficient) that for each x ∈ X, the set Dxs(x, Y ) = {Dxs(x, y) |
y ∈ Y } ⊂ Rn be convex; if this condition fails, it is possible to con-
struct measures µ and ν with smooth positive densities for which F is
discontinuous.
When m > n, this convexity is particularly restrictive; it can be
shown to fail, unless the function s takes a reducible, or index form,
s(x, y) = b(I(x), y), for some I : X → Rn [Pass (2012b)]. We will
illustrate this phenomenon with an example later on.
Even when this convexity holds, the optimal map may not be contin-
uous in general; in this case, their regularity is governed by a restrictive
fourth order differential condition on s, known as the Ma-Trudinger-
Wang condition (see [Ma, Trudinger & Wang (2005)] and [Loeper (2009)]).
[Kim & McCann (2010)] show this condition to be equivalent to a sign
condition on the curvature of the space X × Y geometrized using the
Hessian H as a (pseudo)-Riemannian metric.4
2.2 Extensions
2.2.1 Individual utilities
The stability condition allows information on individual utilities at the
stable match to be recovered. To see why, note first that stability implies
that, for µ almost every x,
u (x) = max
y
(s (x, y)− v (y)) . (14)
4See [McCann (2014)] for a general overview of the regularity of optimal mappings.
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Assume, now, that the matching is pure (say, because the twist con-
dition is satisfied). The envelope theorem then yields, wherever u is
differentiable and y = F (x) is matched with x,
∂u
∂xi
(x) =
∂s
∂xi
(x, F (x)) . (15)
which gives the partials of u, and therefore defines u up to an additive
constant. Note, incidentally, that these partial differential equations
must be compatible, which generates restrictions on the matching func-
tion F ; namely, assuming double differentiability:∑
k
∂2s
∂xi∂yk
∂Fk
∂xj
=
∑
k
∂2s
∂xj∂yk
∂Fk
∂xi
(16)
≥ ∂
2s
∂xi∂xj
(x, F (x)) (17)
where yk = Fk (x) and the partials of s are taken at (x, F (x)) and the
inequality is from (6). In particular, in the case of multi to one dimen-
sional matching, then y = F (x1, ..., xm), and (16) becomes a system
of partial differential equations that F must satisfy (which reduces to
a single equation in case m = 2 = n + 1); together with the measure
restrictions and the matrix inequality (17), this typically identifies the
matching function F . We shall come back to this point in Section 4.
2.2.2 Index and pseudo-index models
A very special case, which has been largely used in practical applications,
is obtained when the surplus function s is weakly separable in one vector
of characteristics. Assume, indeed, that there exist two functions I and
σ, mapping Rn to R and Rm+1 to R respectively, such that:
s (y, x) = σ (x, I (y)) . (18)
In words, the various male characteristics y affect the matching function
only through some one dimensional index I (y). This assumption is quite
restrictive; in practice, it requires that men with different characteristics
y and y′ but the same index (i.e., I (y) = I (y′)) be perfect substitutes
on the matching market for any potential spouse x.
Formally, if s is smooth, then the index form requires that s satisfies
the following conditions:
∂
∂xm
(
∂s/∂yk
∂s/∂yl
)
= 0 ∀k, l,m.
15
These conditions express the fact that the marginal rate of substitution
between yk and yl (which defines the slope of tangent to the correspond-
ing iso-surplus curve) does not depend on x; indeed, (18) implies that:
∂s/∂yk
∂s/∂yl
=
∂I/∂yk
∂I/∂yl
.
The main practical interest of index models is that, whenever (18)
is satisfied, the matching problems is de facto one-dimensional in y;
technically, one can replace the space Y and the measure ν with Y˜ =
ImI ⊂ R and the push-forward ν˜ := I#ν of ν through I defined as in
(4). In particular, when the index property (18) is satisfied, then the
matching problem boils down to a multi-to-one dimensional problem, of
the type discussed in Section 4.5
Another notable property of index models, that was observed in
[Pass (2012b)], is that when m ≤ n, the convexity of the sets {Dys(y, x) |
x ∈ X}, necessary to ensure that the matching function is continuous,
requires that the function s takes the form s(x, y) = σ(x, I(y)), where
here I : Rn → Rm. In particular, when m = 1, s must have an index
form. Therefore, when n > m = 1, if a surplus function s is not of index
form, there are absolutely continuous measures µ and ν (with smooth
densities) for which the matching function F is discontinuous; we will
see an example of this below.
Lastly, the notion of index model can for some purposes be slightly
relaxed. Specifically, we define a pseudo-index model by assuming that
there exist three functions α, I and σ, mapping Rn to R, Rn to R and
Rm+1 to R respectively, such that:
s (x, y) = α (y) + σ (x, I (y)) . (19)
Here, male characteristics y affect the matching function through two
one-dimensional indices α (y) and I (y). The crucial remark, however,
is the following. Assume that Dxσ (x, i) is injective in i; this simply
requires that ∂σ/∂xk (x, i) is strictly monotonic in i for at least one k.
Then:
Dxs(x, y) = Dxσ (x, I (y)) 6= Dxσ (x, I (y0)) = Dxs(x, y0)
for any y, y0 such that I (y) 6= I (y0). It follows from the proof of the twist
theorem that the support of the stable measure is born by the graph of
5A practical difficulty is that, for most empirical applications, the in-
dex I is not known ex ante and has to be empirically estimated. See
[Chiappori, Oreffice & Quintana-Domeque (2012)] for a precise discussion.
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a function. Although the stable matching on Rm×Rn is not pure (since
all males with the same index are perfect substitutes), for the ‘reduced’
matching problem defined on Rm × R by the surplus function σ (x, i)
and the measures µ and I#ν, the stable matching is pure - i.e., there
exists a function φ such that any women x is matched with probability
one with a man whose index is i = φ (x). In particular, most results
derived in the multi to one dimensional case (see Section 4 below) still
apply in that case.
2.2.3 Links with hedonic models
Next, we briefly recall the canonical link between matching and hedonic
models,6 which will be crucial for some of our applications (particularly
the competitive IO model and the competitive version of Rochet-Chone´).
An hedonic model involves three sets: a set X of buyers (endowed with
a measure µ), a set Y of sellers (endowed with a measure ν) and a
set Z of products; intuitively, a product is defined by a finite vector of
characteristics, and buyers purchase one product (at most) in any period
— think of a car or a house, for instance. Both buyers and sellers are
price-takers, and consider the price P (z) of any product z ∈ Z as given.
A buyer with a vector of characteristics x maximizes a quasi-linear utility
of the form
U = u (x, z)− P (z)
while producer y maximizes profit
Π = P (z)− c (y, z)
where c (y, z) is the cost, for producer y to produce product z.
Remark 10 It is important to note that the producer’s profit depends
on his characteristics, on the product’s characteristics and on the price,
but not on the characteristics of the buyer. This ‘private value’ aspect
will be crucial for the relationship with bidimensional adverse selection
that we discuss below.
An hedonic equilibrium is defined as a measure α on the product set
X×Y ×Z, whose first and second marginals are µ and ν, and a function
P such that, for any (x¯, y¯, z¯) ∈ sptα, then
z¯ ∈ arg max
z
(u (x, z)− P (z)) ∩ arg max
z
(P (z)− c (y, z)) .
6See [Chiappori, McCann & Nesheim (2010)], [Ekeland (2005)] and
[Ekeland (2010)].
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In words, α represents an assignment of buyers and sellers to each other
and to products, and an equilibrium is reached if the product assigned
to x (resp. y) maximizes x’s utility (y’s profit).
To see the link with matching models, define the pairwise surplus
function
s (x, y) = sup
z∈Z
u (x, z)− c (y, z) . (20)
and consider the matching model defined by (X, Y, s). Then [Chiappori, McCann & Nesheim (2010)]
prove the following results:
• for any equilibrium of the hedonic model, the projection of the
measure α on the set X × Y , together with the functions
U (x) = max
z
u (x, z)− P (z) and V (y) = max
z
(P (z)− c (y, z))
form a stable matching.
• Conversely, for any γ that solves the matching problem, there exist
a price function P that satisfies
inf
y∈Y
{v (y, z) + r (y)} ≥ P (z) ≥ sup
x∈X
{u (x, z)− q (x)} (21)
With α ≡ (idX × idY × z0)# γ, where z0 = z0(x, y) ∈ arg maxz u(x, z)−
c(y, z), any such P forms an equilibrium pair (α, P ).
2.2.4 Testability
Lastly, let’s briefly consider the important issue of testability: what
testable restrictions (if any) are generated by the general matching struc-
ture described above? Obviously, the answer depends on what we can
observe. Consider the simplest case, in which we only observe match-
ing patterns (‘who marries whom’). Technically, we are now facing an
inverse problem: knowing the spaces X and Y and the measure γ, can
we find a surplus s for which γ is stable? This question should however
be slightly rephrased to rule out degerate solutions; for instance, any
measure is stable for the degenerate surplus s (x, y) = 0 ∀x, y.
We therefore consider the following problem: Given two spaces X,
Y and some measure γ on X × Y , is is always possible to find a surplus
s such that γ is the unique stable matching of the matching problem
(X, Y, s)?
A first remark is that if we impose enough ‘regularity’ in the model,
the answer is positive. Specifically, let us consider the case in which the
support of the measure is born by the graph of some function F , and
that F is non-degenerate (in the sense that the derivative of F has full
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rank over the entire space). Then one can always find a surplus for which
γ is the unique stable matching: we just need to take s(x, y) = −|F (x)−
y|2/2. Indeed, γ obviously maximizes the primal, optimal transportation
problem, which guarantees stability; moreover, the surplus satisfies the
twist condition, which guarantees uniqueness. The corresponding payoffs
are u(x) = 0 = v(y).
However, non-degeneracy is crucial for this result to hold. For one
thing, if F is degenerate, the twist condition does not hold, and while γ
is always stable for s (x, y) = −|F (x)− y|2/2, it may not be the unique
stable matching. Moreover, and while Theorem 8 implies that any stable
matching for a non-degenerate surplus concentrates on a set of dimension
at most max(m,n), it is possible to find measures supported on sets of
this dimension which are not stable for any C2, non-degenerate surplus.
To see this, consider the m = n = 1 case; let X = Y = (0, 1) ⊆ R. Non-
degeneracy here simply means ∂
2s
∂x∂y
6= 0, which implies either ∂2s
∂x∂y
> 0
everywhere (so s is super-modular) or ∂
2s
∂x∂y
< 0 everywhere (so s is sub-
modular). In these two cases, it is well known that stable matches con-
centrate on monotone increasing or decreasing sets, respectively. There-
fore, any γ concentrating on a set of dimension max(m,n) = 1 (for
instance, a smooth curve), which is neither globally increasing nor de-
creasing (for example, the curve (y = 4(x− 1/2)2), cannot be stable for
any non-degenerate surplus.
3 Matching with unequal dimensions
We now turn special attention to the case in which the dimensions m ≥ n
of heterogeneity on the two sides of the market are unequal. In this
case, one expects many-to-one rather than one-to-one matching. In a
companion publication, we develop a detailed mathematical theory for
this situation, focusing especially on the case m > n = 1. Here we
announce only the main conclusions of that theory and a few of the
underlying ideas, suppressing technical details wherever possible to be
able to move quickly on to interpretation and applications.
When m ≥ n, it is natural to expect that at equilibrium the subset
F−1(y) ⊂ X ⊂ Rm of partners which a man of type y ∈ Dom0Dv
is indifferent to will generically have dimension m − n, or equivalently,
codimension n. We are interested in specifying conditions under which
this indifference set will in fact be a smooth submanifold.7 Let us explore
this situation, paying particular attention to the separate roles played
by the surplus function s(x, y) as opposed to the populations µ and ν in
7In the familiar case n = m it would then consist of one (or more) isolated points
— a single one if s happens to be twisted.
19
determining these indifference sets.
3.1 Potential indifference sets
For any equilibrium matching γ and payoffs (u, v), we have already seen
that (x, y) ∈ S ∩ (X ×Dom0Dv) implies (8). That is, all partner types
x ∈ X for husband y ∈ Dom0Dv lie in the same level set of the map
x 7→ Dys(x, y). If we know Dv(y), we can determine this level set
precisely; it depends on µ and ν as well as s. However, in the absence of
this knowledge it is useful to define the potential indifference sets, which
for given y ∈ Y are merely the level sets of the map x ∈ X 7→ Dys(x, y).
We can parameterize these level sets by (cotangent) vectors k ∈ Rn:
X(y, k) := {x ∈ X | Dys(x, y) = k}, (22)
or we can think of y ∈ Y as inducing an equivalence relation between
points of X, under which x and x¯ ∈ X are equivalent if and only if
Dys(x, y) = Dys(x¯, y).
Under this equivalence relation, the equivalent classes take the form (22).
We call these equivalence classes potential indifference sets, since they
represent a set of partner types which y ∈ DomDv has the potential to
be indifferent between. The equivalence class containing a given partner
type x¯ ∈ X will also be denoted by
Lx¯(y) = X(y,Dys(x¯, y)) = {x ∈ X | Dys(x, y) = Dys(x¯, y)}. (23)
A key observation concerning potential indifference sets is the follow-
ing proposition.
Definition 11 (Surplus degeneracy) Given X ⊂ Rm and Y ⊂ Rn,
we say s ∈ C2(X×Y ) degenerates at (x, y) ∈ X×Y if rank(D2xys(x¯, y¯)) <
min{m,n}. Otherwise we say s is non-degenerate at (x¯, y¯).
Proposition 12 (Structure of potential indifference sets) Let s ∈
Cr+1(X × Y ) for some r ≥ 1, where X ⊂ Rm and Y ⊂ Rn with m ≥ n.
If s does not degenerate at (x¯, y¯) ∈ X × Y , then x¯ admits a neighbour-
hood U ⊂ Rm such that Lx¯(y¯) ∩ U coincides with the intersection of X
with a Cr-smooth, codimension n submanifold of U .
Proof. Since s ∈ C2, the surplus extends to a neighbourhood U × V
of (x¯, y¯) on which s continues to be non-degenerate (by lower semi-
continuity of the rank). The set {x ∈ U | Dys(x, y) = Dys(x¯, y¯)}
forms a codimension n submanifold of U , by the preimage theorem
20
[Guillemin & Pollack (1974), §1.4]. More specifically, the rank condi-
tion implies that choosing a suitable orthonormal basis for Rm yields
det[ ∂
2s
∂xi∂yj
(x¯, y¯)]1≤i,j≤n 6= 0. In these coordinates, the potential indiffer-
ence set is locally parameterized as the inverse image under the Cr map
x ∈ U 7→ (Dys(x, y¯), xn+1, . . . , xm) of the affine subspace {Dys(x¯, y¯)} ×
Rn−m. Taking U and V smaller if necessary, the inverse function theo-
rem then shows Lx¯(y¯) ∩ U to be Cr.
Although we have stated the proposition in local form, it implies that
if k¯ = Dys(x¯, y¯) is a regular value of x ∈ X 7→ Dys(x, y¯) — meaning
D2xys(x, y¯) has rank n throughout Lx¯(y¯) — then Lx¯(y¯) = X(y¯, k¯) is the
intersection of X with an m− n dimensional submanifold of Rm. Note
however that this proposition says nothing about points (x¯, y¯) where s
degenerates, which can happen throughout spt γ.
3.2 Potential versus actual indifferences sets
As argued above, the potential indifference sets (22) and (23) are deter-
mined by the surplus function s(x, y) without reference to the popula-
tions µ and ν to be matched. On the other hand, the indifference set
actually realized by each y ∈ Y depends on the relationship between µ,
ν and s. This dependency is generally complicated, as illustrated by the
following example.
Example 13 Consider the surplus function:
s (x, y) = x1y1 + x2y2 + x3y1y2
where X ⊂ R3, Y ⊂ R2. The potential indifference sets are given, for
any k ∈ R2, by:
X(y, k) :=
x ∈ X |
x1 + x3y2 = k1
and
x2 + x3y1 = k2
 . (24)
These are straight lines in R3, parallel to the vector
y2y1
−1
. Therefore,
for any given y ∈ R2, we know that the set of spouses matched with
y (the indifference set corresponding to husband y) will be contained in
such a straight line. However, it is certainly not true that any such line
(obtained for an arbitrary choice of k) will be an indifference set curve.
For a given y, the exact equation of the indifference set corresponding
to y is defined by the value of the specific vector k which is relevant for
that particular y — and this depends on the measures µ and ν.
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However, there is one case in the problem may simplify substantially:
the case of multi-to-one dimensional matching, namely n = 1. In this
case, suppose D2xys(·, y) is non-vanishing (i.e. ∂s∂y (·, y) takes only regular
values). Then the potential indifference sets X(y, k) are codimension 1
in Rm; that is, they are curves in R2, surfaces in R3, and hypersurfaces
in higher dimensions m ≥ 4. Moreover, as k moves through R, these
potential indifference sets sweep out more and more of the mass of µ.
For each y ∈ Y there will be some choice of k ∈ R for which the µ
measure of {x | Dys(x, y) ≤ k} exactly coincides with the ν measure of
(−∞, y] (assuming both measures are absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue, or at least that µ concentrates no mass on hypersurfaces
and ν has no atoms). In this case the potential indifference set X(y, k)
is said to split the population proportionately at y, making it a natural
candidate for being the true indifference set F−1(y) to be matched with
y.8 In the next Section, we go on to describe and contrast situations in
which this expectation is born out and leads to a complete solution from
those in which it does not.
4 Multi-to-one dimensional matching
We now explain a new approach to a specific class of models, largely un-
explored in either the mathematics or economics literature, but which
can often be solved explicitly with the techniques outlined below and
developed more fully in [Chiappori, McCann & Pass (preprint)]. These
are multi-to-one dimensional models, in which agents on one side of the
market (say wives) are bi-dimensional (or, potentially, higher dimen-
sional) while agents on the other side (husbands) are one-dimensional.
Thus, we are matching a distribution on x = (x1, ..., xm) ∈ Rm with
another on y ∈ R. The surplus s is then a function s (x1, ..., xm, y) of
m+ 1 real variables, and will typically be increasing in each argument.
The crucial notion, is this setting, is that of a iso-husband curve,
defined as the indifference set of a given husband y, i.e. as the sub-
manifold of wives among which husband y turns out to be indifferent
facing the given market conditions. Iso-husband curves, as we shall see,
play a key role in the construction of an explicit solution to the match-
ing/optimal transportation problem. In addition, a crucial property of
these curves is that they can in principle be empirically identified; see
[Chiappori, Oreffice & Quintana-Domeque (2012)] for a detailed discus-
sion. In fact, it has been argued that the theoretical properties of iso-
husband curves could provide the most powerful empirical tests of match-
8Since k = sy(x, y) can be recovered from any x ∈ X(y, k) and y, we may equiv-
alently say x splits the population proportionately at y, and vice versa.
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ing theory (see for instance [Chiappori, Oreffice & Quintana-Domeque (preprint)]).
The goal is to construct from data (s, µ, ν) a matching function
F : X −→ Y ⊂ R, whose level sets F−1(y) constitute iso-husband
curves. At the end of the preceding section we identified a natural can-
didate for this indifference set: namely the potential indifference set
which divides the mass of µ in the same ratio as y divides ν; whether or
not these natural candidates actually fit together to form the level sets
of a function or not depends on a subtle interaction between µ, ν and
s. When they do, we say the model is nested, and in that case we show
that the resulting function F : X −→ Y produces a stable equilibrium
match.
Mathematically, the simplest multi-to-one dimensional models arise
from index surpluses, which have economic motivation arising from [Chiappori, Oreffice & Quintana-Domeque (2012)].
These models are nested for every choice of the distributions ν and µ,
as we demonstrate below. Moreover, in the following section, we will
discuss three applications of multidimensional matching theory; the first
two of these deal explicitly with multi-to-one dimensional problems. The
first model arises in the marriage market, where recent research indicates
that it is appropriate to model women using both education and fertil-
ity and men using income only [Low (2014)][Low (preprint)]. A second
example comes from a hedonic variant of the Rochet-Chone´ screening
problem.
4.1 Constructing explicit solutions for nested data
We now give a heuristic description of a general algorithm for construct-
ing the solution to the matching problem when one of the dimensions is
n = 1; the aim is to find a solution to (16) above (or, equivalently, (15)),
which satisfies the mass balance condition ν = F#µ and the spacelike
condition in Theorem 8. In order to work, our approach requires the
nestedness property mentioned above and detailed below. These condi-
tions are satisfied in a wide class of multi-to-one dimensional matching
problems; they are illustrated in the theorem and examples presented
below. However, except in the Spence-Mirrlees (with m = n = 1) and
in the index and pseudo-index cases, this nestedness depends not only
on s, but also on µ and ν.
For each fixed y ∈ Y ⊆ R, our goal is to identify the iso-husband (or
indifference) set {x ∈ X | F (x) = y} of husband type y facing the given
market conditions. When differentiability of v holds at y, the argument
in the preceding section implies that this is contained in one of the
potential indifference sets X(y, k) from (22). Proposition 12 indicates
when this set will have codimension 1; it generally divides X into two
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pieces: the sublevel set
X≤(y, k) := {x ∈ X | ∂s
∂y
(x, y) ≤ k}, (25)
and its complement X>(y, k) := X \ X≤(y, k). We denote its strict
variant by X<(y, k) := X≤(y, k) \X(y, k).
To select the appropriate level set, assuming F is differentiable, the
spacelike condition implies ∂F
∂xi
(x) ∂
2s
∂xi∂y
≥ 0 for each i = 1, . . . ,m. Sum-
ming on i suggests points x¯ in the region X≤(y, k) get paired with points
y¯ ≤ y. We therefore choose the unique level set splitting the population
proportionately with y; that is, the k = k(y) for which the µ measure
of female types X≤(y, k) coincides with the ν measure of male types
(−∞, y]. We then set y := F (x) for each x in the set X(y, k).
Our first theorem specifies conditions under which the resulting match
γ = (id × F )#µ optimizes the Kantorovich problem (MK); we view it
as the natural generalization of the positive assortative matching re-
sults of [Mirrlees (1971)] [Becker (1973)] and [Spence (1973)] from the
one-dimensional to the multi-to-one dimensional setting. Unlike their
criterion, which depends only on s, ours relates s to µ and ν, by re-
quiring the sublevel sets y ∈ Y 7→ X≤(y, k(y)) identified by the proce-
dure above to depend monotonically on y ∈ R, with the strict inclusion
X≤(y, k(y)) ⊂ X<(y′, k(y′)) holding whenever ν[(y, y′)] > 0. We say
the model (s, µ, ν) is nested in this case. Our situation is naturally
more complicated than theirs, since there is no obvious ordering of the
women’s types, but generally a variety of possible orderings depending
on population frequencies µ and ν; nestedness rather asserts that the
women’s preferences enjoy some degree of compatibility, in the sense
that for [y, y¯] ⊂ Y any wife x¯ ∈ X(y¯, k(y¯)) assigned to the higher type
of husband has a greater willingness to pay for variations in the qualities
of husband type y¯ (and similarly of husband type y) than does any wife
x ∈ X(y, k(y)) assigned to the lower type of husband.
Theorem 14 (Optimality of nested matchings) Let X ⊂ Rm and
Y ⊂ R be connected open sets equipped with Borel probability measures µ
and ν. Assume ν has no atoms and µ vanishes on each C1 hypersurface.
Use s ∈ C2(X × Y ) and sy = ∂s∂y to define X≤, X< etc., as in (25)
Assume s is non-degenerate, |Dxsy| 6= 0, throughout X × Y . Then
for each y ∈ Y there is a maximal interval K(y) = [k−(y), k+(y)] 6= ∅
such that µ[X≤(y, k)] = ν[(−∞, y)] for all k ∈ K(y). Both k+ and −k−
are upper semicontinuous. Assume both maps y ∈ Y 7→ X≤(y, k±(y)) are
non-decreasing, and moreover that
∫ y′
y
dν > 0 implies X≤(y, k+(y)) ⊆
X<(y
′−(y′)). Then k+ = k− holds ν-a.e. Setting F (x) = y for each
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x ∈ X(y, k+(y)) defines a stable match F : X −→ Y [µ-a.e.]. Moreover,
γ = (id × F )#µ maximizes (MK) uniquely on Γ(µ, ν). Finally, if spt ν
is connected then F extends continuously to X.
Idea of proof. Non-degeneracy implies X(y, k) := X≤(y, k)\X<(y, k)
is an m−1 dimensional C1 submanifold of X orthogonal to Dxsy(x, y) 6=
0. Since both µ and ν vanish on hypersurfaces, the function
h(y, k) := µ[X≤(y, k)]− ν[(−∞, y)] (26)
is continuous, and for each y ∈ Y climbs monotonically from−ν[(−∞, y)]
to 1 − ν[(−∞, y)] with k ∈ R. This proves the existence of k±(y) and
confirms the zero set of h(y, k) is closed. Thus k− is lower semicontinu-
ous, k+ is upper semicontinuous, and by the intermediate value theorem
[k−(y), k+(y)] is non-empty.
The main strategy for the rest of the proof is to use k+(y) to con-
struct a Lipschitz equilibrium payoff function v by solving v′+(y) =
k+(y) a.e. Together with u from (14), it can be shown that (u, v)
minimizes the dual problem (MK∗) and γ = (id × F )#µ maximizes
the planners problem (MK). For details and the case s ∈ C1,1, see
[Chiappori, McCann & Pass (preprint)].
Note that nestedness is a property of the three-tuple (s, µ, ν); that
is, for most surplus functions, the model may or may not be nested
depending on the measures under consideration. In some cases, however,
the surplus function is such that the model is nested for all measures
(s, µ, ν). This is the case for the pseudo-index models defined above.
Indeed, assume that the surplus has the form:
s (x1, x2, y) = α (x1, x2) + σ (I (x1, x2) , y) . (27)
Then
∂s
∂y
(x, y) =
∂σ
∂y
(I (x1, x2) , y)
only depends on (x1, x2) through the one-dimensional index I (x). It
follows that the iso-husband sets are defined by equations of the type
I (x) = k (y), which do not depend on y. Such curves cannot intersect
as soon as k (y) is strictly monotonic in y.9,10
9In the un-nested case, it may still be possible to solve the problem using ad
hoc methods. For example, in some cases it can be determined apriori that γ must
couple certain subsets of X with certain subsets of Y . Then, the method above may
be applied succesfully to these subsets, even if it fails when applied to the whole of
X and Y . We demonstrate this with an example (see Remark 5.1.4 below).
10A similar scheme was developed in [Pass (2012b)], and under strong conditions
on the marginals µ and ν and the surplus s, it was proven that this yields the optimal
solution.
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In [Chiappori, McCann & Pass (preprint)] we show the converse is
also true: a non-degenerate surplus is pseudo-index if and only if (s, µ, ν)
is nested for all choices of absolutely continuous population densities µ
and ν.
4.2 Criteria for nestedness
The preceding theorem illustrates the powerful implications of nested-
ness, when it is present. For suitable data, the next theorem and corol-
laries give characterizations of nestedness which are often simpler to
check in practice. These are based on a description of the motion of the
iso-husband set in response to changes in the husband type, which is ob-
tained using the theory of level set dynamics. Once again, sharper state-
ments and detailed proofs may be found in [Chiappori, McCann & Pass (preprint)].
There the conclusion of following theorem is also shown to be sharp, in
the sense that dk/dy diverges at the endpoints of Y whenever the area
of the iso-husband sets F−1(y) shrinks to zero. Since we intend to ap-
ply the theorem on Lipschitz domains, we first recall the definition of
transversality in that context.
Definition 15 (Transversality) Recall X(y, k(y)) intersects ∂X ∈ C1
non-transversally if their normals coincide (or equivalently, are multi-
ples of each other) at some point of intersection. If ∂X is merely Lip-
schitz, they intersect non-transversally if the inward or outward normal
to X(y, k(y)) is a generalized normal to ∂X, meaning it can be expressed
as limit of convex combinations of outward normals at arbitrarily close
points where ∂X is differentiable.
Theorem 16 (Dependence of iso-husbands on husband type) Let
X ⊂ Rm and Y ⊂ R be connected Lipschitz domains, equipped with
Borel probability measures dµ(x) = f(x)dx and dν(y) = g(y)dy whose
Lebesgue densities satisfy log f ∈ C1(X) and log g ∈ C0loc(Y ). Assume
s ∈ C3 and non-degenerate throughout X × Y . Then the functions k±
of Theorem 14 coincide. Moreover k := k± ∈ C1loc(Y \ Z) outside the
relatively closed set
Z := {y ∈ Y | X(y, k(y)) intersects ∂X non-transversally}. (28)
As y ∈ Y \ Z increases the outward normal velocity of X≤(y, k(y)) at
x ∈ X(y, k(y)) is given by (k′ − syy)/|Dxsy|.
Sketch of proof. Under the additional regularity assumed in the
theorem, we differentiate (26) at y 6∈ Z to obtain
hk :=
∂h
∂k
=
∫
X(y,k)
f(x)
dHm−1(x)
|Dxsy(x, y)| > 0 and
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hy :=
∂h
∂y
=−g(y)−
∫
X(y,k)
f(x)
syy(x, y)
|Dxsy(x, y)|dH
m−1(x), (29)
where Hm−1 is Hausdorff m − 1 dimensional (surface) measure. The
formula for hk is a straightforward application of the co-area formula
from [Evans & Gariepy (1992)]; it can also be seen as a consequence of
the fundamental theorem of calculus, after applying the implicit function
theorem to sy(x, y) = k to get |Dxsy|−1 as the outward normal velocity at
x of X≤(y, k) when k is increased as y is held fixed. The corresponding
formula (29) for hy results from the fact that the analogous Lipschitz
velocity is given by −syy/|Dxsy| when y is increased as k is held fixed.
Note that because y 6∈ Z the limits from the left and the right which
define the derivatives (29) agree; we need not include any additional
contributions to these integrals coming from X(y, k) ∩ ∂X satisfying
sy(x, y) = k. The continous dependence of hk and hy on (y, k) are shown
in [Chiappori, McCann & Pass (preprint)], after which k ∈ C1loc can be
inferred by applying the implicit function theorem to h(y, k(y)) = 0.
As consequences of this description, we obtain two alternate charac-
terizations of nestedness in [Chiappori, McCann & Pass (preprint)]:
Corollary 17 (Dynamic criteria for nestedness) Under the hypothe-
ses of Theorem 16: if the model is nested then k′ − syy ≥ 0 for all
y ∈ Y \ Z and x ∈ X(y, k(y)), with strict inequality holding at some x
for each y. Conversely, if Z = ∅ and strict inequality holds for all y ∈ Y
and x ∈ X(y, k(y)), then the model is nested.
Corollary 18 (Unique splitting criterion for nestedness) A model
(s, µ, ν) satisfying the hypotheses of Theorem 16 with Z = ∅ is nested
if and only each x ∈ X corresponds to a unique y ∈ Y splitting the
population proportionately, i.e. which satisfies∫
X≤(y,sy(x,y))
dµ =
∫ y
−∞
dν. (30)
In this case, the stable matching is given by F (x) = y.
The first corollary states that the model is nested if and only if all
iso-husband sets move outward as y is increased. Besides proving useful
in the examples below, the second corollary shows nestedness is method-
ologically essential: without it, F fails to be well-defined (unless propori-
tionate population splitting were to be augmented with some further
criteria).
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4.3 Smoothness of payoffs and matchings
Finally, we are able to address the questions of smoothness of the match-
ing function F : X −→ Y in the nested case. In general dimension, this
is a notoriously subtle and challenging question [Villani (2009)]. For
n = m > 1 a fairly satisfactory regularity theory has been developed
following work of [Ma, Trudinger & Wang (2005)]. But for m > n = 1
little is known, outside of the pseudo-index case [Pass (2012b)].
Assuming transversality (Z = ∅), Theorems 14 and 16 give conditions
under which F is continuous and k = dv/dk ∈ C1loc on the interiors of
their respective domains. Recalling v′(F (x)) = sy(x, F (x)) from (5),
differentiation yields
(k′(F (x))− syy(x, F (x)))DF (x) = Dxsy(x, F (x)). (31)
Thus we immediately see we can bootstrap continuous differentiability
of the matching function F ∈ C1 from continuity F ∈ C0, wherever the
normal velocity k′ − syy of the iso-husband set of x is strictly positive.
Even assuming s ∈ C∞, to get more smoothness for F from this identity,
we need more smoothness for k, or equivalently v.
Conditions guaranteeing v ∈ Cr,1loc(Y 0) (i.e. r times continuously dif-
ferentiable, with Lipschitz derivatives) for any integer r ≥ 1 are provided
in [Chiappori, McCann & Pass (preprint)]. The overall strategy there is
to use an induction on r to extract additional smoothness of the function
h from (26), starting with that provided by Theorems 14 and 16. Since
h(y, k(y)) = 0, this smoothness is transferred to k = dv/dy using the
implicit function theorem. To differentiate expressions like (29), we first
use a suitably general form of the divergence theorem to rewrite them
as
hk =
∫
X≤(y,k)
∇X · V dmx−
∫
X≤(y,k)∩∂X
V · nˆXdHm−1
hy =−g(y)−
∫
X≤(y,k)
∇X · (syyV )dmx+
∫
X≤(y,k)∩∂X
syyV · nˆXdHm−1
where V (x) = fsyy
Dxsy
|Dxsy |2
∣∣∣
y=F (x)
. Their derivatives are then given as in-
tegrals along the moving interfaces, weighted by normal velocities as in
Theorem 16 and its proof. These in turn must be controlled by appro-
priate assumptions and a delicately structured inductive hypothesis.
Finally we note that smoothness often holds for the one-dimensional
husbands’ payoff function v(y) but not for the multi-dimensional wives’
payoff u(x) or matching function F (x) [Chiappori, McCann & Pass (preprint)].
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4.4 Surplus identification in the nested case
Assume that we can observe iso-husband sets in a multiple market set-
ting; what does it tell us about the surplus? We now give a precise
answer to that question. As already noted, if we only observe matching
patterns, then the surplus s can be identified at best up to an additive
function of x and an additive function of y. This, however, is not the
only flexibility we have in defining s. To see why, remember that an
arbitrary iso-husband set, with an equation of the form y = F (x), lies
in a level set
∂s (x, F (x))
∂y
= k
for some constant k = v′(y). Knowing the map F for a single pair (µ, ν)
tells the direction (but not the magnitude) of Dxsy along the graph of F :
assuming enough smoothness it is given by (31). To get the magnitude
we need to know the husband’s marginal share v′′ of the payoff also.
Although maps F will not generally exist for all choices of pairs (µ, ν)
(counterexamples are given in [Chiappori, McCann & Nesheim (2010)]),
if we know the map F corresponding to enough choices of (µ, ν), then
by a suitable choice we can make the graph of F pass through any
point (x′, y′) that we choose. Lemma 19 below shows that this can be
done with sufficient smoothness for (31) to hold, and that it costs no
generality to take µ uniform on a small ball around x. In this way, we
learn the direction and sign (but not the magnitude, unless we also know
the marginal payoffs v′) of Dxsy globally.
If we also know the payoffs we can integrate Dxsy to find s(x, y), up to
an arbitrary additive function f0(x)+g0(y) (the constants of integration).
On the other hand, without knowing the payoffs, the direction of Dxsy
globally is enough to determine the level sets of sy(·, y) for each y.
Now, the set of continuous functions with the same level sets as a
given function is exactly the set of monotonic transforms of that function.
In other words, a function G(·) has the same level sets as ∂s
∂y
(·, y) if and
only if:
G (x) = H
(
∂s (x, y)
∂y
)
for some monotonic H, possibly depending on y. Fixing y0 ∈ Y , we
conclude that if s¯ is the surplus generating the given iso-husband sets,
then another non-degenerate surplus s generates the same iso-husband
sets if and only if there exists a function H(z, y) with Hz > 0 such that:
s (x, y) = s (x, y0) +
∫ y
y0
H
(
∂s¯ (x, t)
∂y
, t
)
dt.
This conclusion is implied by the following lemma.
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Lemma 19 (Any couple can be smoothly matched) Fix open sets
X ⊂ Rm, Y ⊂ R and s ∈ Cr+1(X × Y ) non-degenerate, with r ≥ 1.
Given (x′, y′) ∈ X × Y , and arbitrary small neighbourhoods U of x′ and
V of y′, we can find an atomless probability measure ν on V such the
stable match F ∈ Cr(U) between ν and the uniform measure µ on U
satisfies y′ = F (x′), and moreoever: (31) holds for all x ∈ U , and the
husband’s payoff v is a quadratic function on Y .
Proof. Since the lemma concerns only the behaviour of s near (x′, y′), it
costs no generality to assume X and Y bounded and s ∈ Cr+1(X × Y ).
Take v(y) to be a quadratic function of y satisfying
v′′(y) = const > max
(x,y)∈X×Y
syy(x, y) (32)
and v′(y′) = sy(x′, y′). Then strict concavity shows for each x ∈ X,
u(x) = max
y∈Y
s(x, y)− v(y) (33)
is uniquely attained by some y ∈ Y , denoted y = F (x). Strict concavity
also shows that if
sy(x, y0)− v′(y0) = 0 (34)
for some y0 ∈ Y then y0 = F (x). In particular, y′ = F (x′), so noting
(32), the implicit function theorem shows y0(x) = F (x) is a C
r solution
to (34) on some neighbourhood U of x′. Differentiating (34) shows (31)
holds on U , so non-degeneracy of s implies DF (x) is non-vanishing. Now
we can take U and V = F (U) to be as small as we please around x′ and
y′. We claim F is the stable match between the uniform measure µ on
U , and its image ν := F#µ, while u and v above are the corresponding
payoffs. The definition (33) shows (u, v) to be stable (3), hence inte-
grating u(x) + v(F (x)) = s(x, F (x)) against µ shows γ = (id × F )#µ
attains the maximum and (u, v) attain the minimum in (9). Finally, ν
is atomless since DF 6= 0 shows F−1(y) to be a Cr hypersurface in U¯ ,
hence µ negligible, by the implicit function theorem once more.
Remark 20 (Any couple has a strongly nested matching) If r ≥
2 in the lemma above, then taking U smaller if necessary, so ∂U inter-
sects each level set of F transversally (or at least Hm−1 negligibly), the
co-area formula can be used as in [Chiappori, McCann & Pass (preprint)]
to show dν(y) = g(y)dy has a density satisfying log g ∈ Cloc(V ). Replac-
ing (X, Y ) by (U, V ), Corollary 17 then shows the model is nested, since
v′′(x)− syy(x, F (x)) > 0.
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5 Applications
We now consider three applications of our framework.
5.1 Application 1: Income and fertility
Our first application considers a model introduced in [Low (2014)] and
[Low (preprint)]. The main question relates to the impact of marriage
market considerations on women’s decision to acquire higher education
(and more precisely a post graduate degree). The trade-off Low consid-
ers is between human capital and fertility (what she calls ‘reproductive
capital’). By engaging in post graduate studies, a woman increases her
human capital, which boosts her future income (among other things).
Most of the time, however, a post graduate degree will require postpon-
ing the birth of children to a later stage of her life, when her fertility
may have declined. Husbands, in Low’s model, are interested in both
the income of potential spouses and their fertility; the interaction be-
tween these two attributes, and their consequences on marital patterns
are precisely what Low investigates.
In what follows, we generalize Low’s model in two directions. First,
while Low assumes that fertility can take only two values (‘high’ for
younger women and ‘low’ for older, more educated ones), we allow for
general distributions of the two characteristics; in particular, we consider
various correlation patterns between them (from independence to nega-
tive correlation). Second, the preferences we consider are slightly more
general than Low’s, in the sense that we allow the presence of children to
decrease utility when the family is poor; in other words, this is a model
in which birth control technologies are either absent or largely imperfect
(several examples can obviously be found in the developing world or in
the history of Western societies). The second feature drastically changes
the qualitative properties of the stable matching; specifically, the model
is nested for some measures but not for others. Moreover, for specific
measures (uniform in our case), both the nested and the unnested cases
can be explicitly solved, which enable us to compare them in a systematic
way.
5.1.1 The model
Men and women are parameterized by subsets Y ⊂ R and X ⊂ R2,
respectively, where
• y ∈ Y represents the husband’s income,
• x1 = p represents the wife’s fertility (probability of having a child)
• x2 = x is the wife’s income.
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All couples with children receive some lump sum benefit B.11
Let qi denote private expenditures of individual i and Q denote ex-
penditures on children. If the couple has children, their preferences take
the form
um (qm, Q) = qm (Q+ 1/2)
uf (qf , Q) = qf (Q+ 1/2)
whereas without children they are
ug (qg) = qg, g = m, f.
Suppose man y marries woman (x, p). Then, with probability p, they
have a child and maximize their combined utility (qm + qf ) (Q+ 1/2)
under the budget constraint:
qm + qf +Q = x+ y +B
If we assume x+y ≥ 1/2−B, the solution to this maximization problem
is
Q+ 1/2 = qm + qf =
x+ y +B + 1/2
2
generating a total utility equal to (x+ y +B + 1/2)2 /4. With proba-
bility 1− p, they do not have a child, and
um + uf = qm + qf = x+ y.
The total utility is therefore equal to the expected value of these two
possible outcomes:
s (p, x, y) = p
(x+ y +B + 1/2)2
4
+ (1− p) (x+ y) .
In what follows, for the sake of simplicity we set the parameter B to
1/2; the solution is therefore defined for all non negative x and y, and
the surplus is
s (p, x, y) = p
(x+ y + 1)2
4
+ (1− p) (x+ y) .
A particular feature of this model is that if parents are poor enough
(when x+y < 1, so that Q < 1/2) their utility with children is less than
11A similar example could readily be constructed with either means-tested benefits
or tax rebates instead of a lump sum payment; the only difference being that the
benefit would then be decreasing or increasing with the couple’s income.
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without - implying that no efficient birth control device is available. Such
a situation can simply be ruled out by assuming that x + y ≥ 1 for all
couples; alternatively, we may consider cases in which some couples are
‘poor’ (x+ y < 1) whereas others are ‘wealthy’ (x+ y ≥ 1). We consider
both cases in our Examples 1 and 2 respectively; interestingly enough,
the mathematical properties are quite different in the two settings, since
one is nested whereas the other is not.
5.1.2 Solution
For this surplus, equation (15) becomes:
(x+ y − 1)p = K(y). (35)
where K(y) = 2[dv(y)
dy
− 1]. Note, in particular, that if K (y¯) = 0 for
some y¯ then all women with x¯ = 1− y¯ marry y¯ irrespective of their p. In
the explicit examples that follow, we will use the proportionate splitting
condition to pin down K (y). For now, we note two general properties:
• the iso-husband set of females (p, x) for husband y is given by the
potential indifference curve
x = 1− y + K (y)
p
.
In the (p, x) plane, this curve is decreasing if and only if K (y) > 0.
It intersects lines of constant p and x transversally, as well as
the northwest and southeast corners, Since the other two corners
match with the endpoints of Y , this will imply Z is empty for the
rectangular domains considered in Examples 1 and 2.
• In addition, while
∂2s
∂x∂y
=
p
2
≥ 0 (36)
we have that
∂2s
∂p∂y
=
x+ y − 1
2
. (37)
If x+ y ≥ 1, by (16) we expect the level sets of F to be decreasing
curves in the (x, p) plane (that is, we expect K(y) > 0), mean-
ing husbands face a trade-off of the income versus the fertility of
their spouse. In the opposite case x + y < 1, these iso-husband
curves may be increasing; we shall see an illustration in our second
example.
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Depending on the measures µ and ν, the problem may or may not
admit a closed form solution. In what follows, we consider three ex-
amples. First, we provide a complete resolution when the distributions
are uniform on [0, 1] × [1/2, 1] and [1/2, 1], respectively. As a second
example, we consider uniform distributions on [0, 1]× [0, 1] and [0, 1].
Lastly, we again take husbands to be uniformly distributed on [1/2, 1],
but take the distribution of wives to be uniform on [1/2, 1]× [1/2, 3/4]∪
[0, 1/2]× [3/4, 1]. This distribution is chosen to reflect an anticorrelation
due to age between fertility and income. Fertility is certainly negatively
correlated with age; on the other hand, women who pursue higher edu-
cation tend to enter the marriage market later in life, and so we expect
age and education to exhibit a positive correlation.
5.1.3 Example 1: uniform and ‘large’ incomes
We start with a benchmark case in which the distributions µ and ν are
uniform on [0, 1]× [1/2, 1] and [1/2, 1] respectively. Although the surplus
degenerates at one corner (p, x, y) = (0, 1
2
, 1
2
) of X × Y , Proposition 21
shows this example is nested, in view of Corollary 18. Moreover, the
optimal matching function F (x, p) can be solved for almost explicitly;
we have the following result, proved in Appendix A; recall that y splits
the population proportionately at (p, x) if
µ
(
X≤(y, sy(p, x, y))
)
=µ
(
{(p¯, x¯) | ∂s(p, x, y)
∂y
≥ ∂s(p¯, x¯, y)
∂y
}
)
= ν([
1
2
, y]).
Proposition 21 Let µ and ν be uniform probability measures on [0, 1]×
[1/2, 1] and [1/2, 1], respectively. For each (p, x) ∈ [0, 1]× [1
2
, 1] there is
a unique y ∈ [1
2
, 1] that splits the population proportionately at (p, x),
and the optimal map takes the form F (p, x) = y.
Note that, by the proof of this Proposition, we can actually derive
an explicit formula for the optimal map:
F (p, x) := sup
y
{
y | µ
(
X<(y, sy(p, x, y))
)
> ν([
1
2
, y))
}
.
We can go one step further, and identify the iso-husband curve con-
sisting of the set of points (p, x) which match with a fixed y; this is
exactly the potential indifference curve (35), for the correct K(y). As is
clear from the proof of Proposition 21, for y ∈ [1
2
, e
2(e−1) ], we have,
K(y)− y − 1/2
ln
(
y
y−1/2
) = 0.
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For y ∈ [ e
2(e−1) , 1], we have K(y) = x¯+y−1, where x¯ is the unique so-
lution in the interval [1/2, 1] of the equation x−y+(x+y−1) ln( y
x+y−1) =
0. A plot of K (y) is provided in Figure 1a, while Figure 1b gives the iso
husband curves for various values of y. Notice K ′(y) = x¯′(y)+1 diverges
like 1/ log y at the endpoint y = 1 where the length of the iso-husband
curve shrinks to zero; the payoff v(y) therefore displays a comparable
singularity in its second derivative.
Insert Figures 1a and 1b about here
5.1.4 Example 2: uniform, smaller incomes
We now consider the same surplus with different measures; namely, the
marginals are uniform on [0, 1] × [0, 1] and [0, 1] respectively. From a
mathematical perspective this case provides an interesting illustration
of an un-nested setting. Formally, our method to derive the optimal
match fails in that case; it turns out that there are more than one y that
split the population proportionately for certain choices (x, p). However,
we are able to use a refinement of the argument to obtain the explicit
optimal match. Specifically, we use the symmetry embedded in the
model to show that the optimal map is given by:
G (p, x) =
{
F (p, x) if x > 1/2,
1− F (p, 1− x) if x < 1/2, (38)
where F is as in the preceding Proposition. This solution displays a
discontinuity along the line x = 1
2
; each wife (p, 1
2
) with income x = 1
2
is
indifferent between two distinct husbands, one richer (y = e
1
p
2(e
1
p−1)
) and
the other poorer (y = 1− e
1
p
2(e
1
p−1)
= e
1
p−2
2(e
1
p−1)
). Although the total surplus
generated by the latter marriage is smaller, her share of it remains the
same. The corresponding isohusband curves are plotted on Figure 2a.
We have also numerically solved this case; the resulting solution agrees
with our theoretical solution and is graphed below (Figure 2b).
Insert Figures 2a and 2b about here
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5.1.5 Example 3: anticorrelated marginals
In this case, the analytic solution is very complicated, and we provide
only a numerical simulation. For  = 0 the numerical solution is plot-
ted below; one interesting feature is that lower income men (whose iso-
husband curves lie in the green, yellow or orange regions) are indifferent
between a selection of wives in both the low fertility, high income regime,
[0, 1
2
]× [3
4
, 1], and the high fertility, low income region [1
2
, 1]× [1
2
, 3
4
+ ],
whereas the highest income men, whose iso-husband curves lie in the
dark red region, match exclusively with wives in the high fertility, low
income regime. This model does not fit the hypotheses of Theorem 16
when  = 0, since X is neither connected nor Lipschitz, but this short-
coming can be rectified by taking  > 0 arbitarily small.
Insert Figure 3 about here
5.2 Application 2: A competitive Rochet-Chone´
model
In our second example, we revisit a seminal model of the literature on
bidimensional adverse selection, due to [Rochet & Chone´ (1998)]. We
therefore consider a hedonic model with:
• An n-dimensional space of products: z = (z1, ..., zn) ∈ Z ⊂ Rn+;
• An n-dimensional space of buyers: x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ X ⊂ Rn+.
Consumers are distributed on this space according to a probability
measure µ. Each consumer will buy exactly one good. Their utility
for purchasing product z for price P (z) is given by U (x, z)−P (z)
where
U (x, z) =
n∑
i=1
xizi,
• A one dimensional space of producers: y ∈ Y ⊂ R+. Producers are
distributed according to a probability measure ν. Each producer
will produce and sell exactly one good. Their profit in selling a
good z for price P (z) is P (z)− c (y, z), where
c (y, z) =
1
2y
n∑
i=1
z2i
is the production cost for producer y to produce a good of type z.
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We note that this is exactly the model of [Rochet & Chone´ (1998)],
with the additional twist that the monopoly producer is replaced with
a competitive set of heterogeneous producers (whose productivity in-
creases in y).12 As we will see, however, introducing competition has
striking consequences. In particular, and somewhat surprisingly, there
is no bunching in this new variant of their model: consumers of different
types always buy goods of different types. We illustrate these facts with
an example, finding explicitly the optimal matching for certain choices
of µ and ν, and then provide a general proof.
5.2.1 Equilibrium
As argued above, this hedonic pricing problem is equivalent to the match-
ing problem on X × Y associated with the surplus:
s (x, y) = max
z∈Z
(
n∑
i=1
xizi − 1
2y
n∑
i=1
z2i
)
The maximum in the preceding equation is obtained (assuming {yx |
y ∈ Y, x ∈ X} ⊂ Z) when
zi = xiy
and so
s (x, y) =
1
2
y
(
n∑
i=1
x2i
)
.
Now, note that the twist condition is satisfied here; in fact, this
surplus function is of index form, s(x, y) = S(I(x), y) := I(x)y
2
, where
I(x) = |x|2, and S satisfies the classical Spence-Mirrlees condition ∂2S
∂I∂y
>
0. The isoproducer curves take the form
∑n
i=1 x
2
i = K(y), and the
matching is monotone increasing between |x| and y.
5.2.2 An explicit example
We explicitly solve this problem for a particular choice of measures. Let
m = 2 and µ be uniform measure (normalized to have total mass 1) on
the quarter disk {
(x1, x2) | x21 + x22 ≤ 1, x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0
}
and ν uniform on [1, 2]. The stable matching balances the mass of the
quarter disc
{x | |x|2 ≤ K(y)}
12Clearly, heterogeneity is not crucial, since the measure on the set Y could be a
Dirac. The crucial distinction with Rochet-Chone´ is the competitive assumption.
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with the ν mass of [1, y]. This implies
pi4K(y)2
4pi
= y − 1
of K(y) =
√
y − 1. In other words, the optimal matching takes the form
F (x) = |x|2 + 1.
Agent x then buys the product z such that:
zi = xi
(
n∑
k=1
x2k + 1
)
, i = 1, ..., n.
The envelope condition implies that agent x’s utility satisfies
∂u
∂xi
(x) =
∂s
∂xi
(x, F (x))
or,
∂u
∂xi
(x) = xiF (x) = xi
(
1 +
n∑
k=1
x2k
)
.
Similarly,
v′ (y) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
x2i =
y − 1
2
.
Integrating these equations yields
u (x) =A+
1
2
n∑
i=1
x2i +
1
4
(
n∑
i=1
x2i
)2
v (y) =B +
(y − 1)2
4
.
Now, for y = F (x), we must have u(x) + v(y) = s(x, y). Inserting
y = F (x) = |x|2 + 1 into our equation for v yields
u(x) + v(F (x)) = A+B+
1
2
|x|2 + 1
4
|x|4 + 1
4
|x|4 = A+B+ 1
2
|x|2 + 1
2
|x|4.
On the other hand,
s(x, F (x)) =
1
2
(|x|2 + 1)|x|2;
equating these implies A = −B. In what follows we assume A = B = 0;
the interpretation is that the firm with the highest production costs
(y = 1) makes zero profit.
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We now turn our attention to the equilibrium pricing schedule, P (z).
Following [Chiappori, McCann & Nesheim (2010)], the stability condi-
tions
u (x) + v (y) ≥ s (x, y) ≥ U (x, z)− c (y, z)
imply
inf
y
(v (y) + c (y, z)) ≥ P (z) ≥ sup
x
(U (x, z)− u (x))
or
inf
y
(
(y − 1)2
4
+
1
2y
n∑
i=1
z2i
)
≥ P (z) ≥ sup
x
 n∑
i=1
xizi − 1
2
n∑
i=1
x2i −
1
4
(
n∑
i=1
x2i
)2 .
The solution takes the form
P (z) = P¯ (Z) ,
where Z = |z|2. Note that when agent y sells good z, we must have
P (Z) =
(y − 1)2
4
+
1
2y
n∑
i=1
z2i =
(y − 1)2
4
+
1
2y
Z.
The first order conditions then imply
1
2
(y − 1) = 1
2y2
Z,
so that Z = y2 (y − 1). We can then solve for P (Z) in terms of y;
P =
(y − 1)2
4
+
1
2y
Z
=
1
4
(3y − 1) (y − 1) .
Noting that Z = |z|2 = y2|x|2 = y2(y − 1) then yields a parametric
representation for the curve (Z, P (Z)):
(Z, P (Z)) =
(
y2 (y − 1) , 1
4
(3y − 1) (y − 1)
)
This is plotted on Figure 4.
Insert Figure 4 about here
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Some comments can be made on this solution. First, and unlike the
Rochet-Chone´ monopoly case, there is no exclusion; all agents buy prod-
ucts. This property is easily understood from the matching formulation;
as every potential match generates a positive surplus, surplus maximiza-
tion implies that no agents will be excluded.13 Note, however, that the
introduction of outside options might reverse this conclusion. More in-
teresting (and more surprising) is the second finding, namely that there
is no bunching of any type: the efficient allocation is fully separating
so that different agents always buy different goods. This no bunching
conclusion is less intuitive; it is not clear, a priori, whether it holds for
general choices of the measures µ and ν, or it is an artifact of the partic-
ular measures we use in this example. We now present a theorem which
states that the former interpretation is correct.
5.2.3 The general case
The method for deriving the optimal matching will always work here; as
the surplus has an index form, issues with level sets crossing do not arise.
Of particular interest, the no bunching result is completely general, as
the following result, proved in an appendix, confirms:
Theorem 22 Different consumer types always buy different goods. That
is, if x 6= x¯, and z and z¯ represent the respective goods they choose, then
z 6= z¯.
Proof. See Appendix
It can be stressed that there are no restrictions on the measures in this
theorem. In particular, it applies when µ is uniform measure on the unit
square in R2, and ν is a Dirac mass at y = 1; these conditions provide
the closest analogue to the Rochet-Chone´ problem. The difference is
that here we have a continuum of homogeneous producers (each with
identical production cost |z|
2
2
for good z ∈ R2) competing with each
other, rather than a monopoly. In other words, the bunching phenomena
present in the Rochet-Chone´ solution are not intrinsically linked to the
multidimensionality of the consumer type space; rather, they are due to
market inefficiencies created by the monopoly.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the framework under consid-
eration can always be seen as a model of competition under adverse
selection; in that sense, the matching approach provides a natural def-
inition of an equilibrium in such a framework. A crucial remark, how-
ever, is that the model is characterized by its private value nature,
13Exclusion is linked to the monopoly logic: by excluding some consumers, the
monopolist can increase the rent received from other buyers.
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since the producer’s profit is not directly related to the identity of
the consumer buying its product (it only depends on the characteris-
tics of the product and its price). This is in sharp contrast with a
common value setting, in which the buyer’s characteristics directly im-
pact the producer’s profit. Think, for instance, of an insurance model a
la [Rothschild & Stiglitz (1976)], in which the same insurance contract
generates different profit depending on the buyer’s unobserved charac-
teristics (in that case her risk). Technically, the producer’s cost function
c now depends on y and z as before, but also on x. The key point is that,
in such a common value context, the equivalence between matching and
hedonic models is lost. In particular, it is not true in general that there
always exists a price function P (z) such that a stable matching can be
implemented as an hedonic equilibrium. Our approach, therefore, does
construct a first bridge between the literatures on matching and opti-
mal transportation on the one hand, and competition under asymmetric
information on the other hand; however, the relationship is specific to
private value models. In the non-competitve setting of the principal-
agent framework, the analogous connection found in [Carlier (2001)] and
[Figalli, Kim & McCann (2011)] has proven exteremely fruitful.
5.3 Application 3: a simple hedonic model
As a last illustration, we consider a simple hedonic model, in which
consumers have heterogeneous tastes for differentiated products, which
are produced by firms with heterogeneous cost functions. The basic
framework is similar to the previous, Rochet-Chone´ one14, except for
one feature: the cost function is now:
c (y, z) =
n∑
i=1
z2i
2yi
where the vector y = (y1, ..., yn) is producer-specific. The multidimen-
sionality of y reflects the fact that different producers made have dif-
ferent comparative advantages in producing some of the characteris-
tics but not others; for instance, a producer may be good at producing
fast cars but less efficient for smaller ones.15 Note that, unlike most of
the empirical IO literature (starting with the seminal contributions by
[Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995)] and [Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (2004)]
14In particular, we keep utilities of the form
∑
i xizi, where x = (x1, ..., xn) de-
notres an agent’s idiosyncratic valuations of product characteristics. For empirical
applications, x will typically be considered as a random vector.
15We maintain here the assumption that each firm produces one good. This can
readily be relaxed provided that production functions are linear in quantity produced
(while quadratic in characteristics z).
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), which assume imperfect competition, our hedonic framework posits
that producers are price takers. In that sense, our matching framework
can be seen as an alternative approach to modeling competition in dif-
ferentiated products.
The characterization of the equilibrium follows the same path as
before. The surplus function is:
s (x, y) = max
z∈Z
n∑
i=1
(
xizi − z
2
i
2yi
)
.
Here, the maximum is obtained when zi = xiyi, leading to:
s (x, y) =
1
2
n∑
i=1
x2i yi
Since s is continuous, existence follows from Theorem 4. Moreover,
this form is a particular case of the general structure studied in sub-
section 2.4. It follows that the twist condition is satisfied whenever
x ∈ Rn+, an assumption we maintain throughout the current subsection.
This guarantees uniqueness and purity:16 there exists a function F such
that x is matched with y = F (x). The simplicity of these existence and
uniqueness arguments is indeed an important advantage of the matching
approach.
As mentioned above, purity implies that different agents are matched
with different producers. Moreover, since zi = xiyi, a result by Linden-
laub implies that different agents always buy different products; in other
words, there is no bunching in this model. Clearly, these conclusions fol-
lows from the assumption that the dimension of heterogeneity is the same
for individuals and firms. If this assumption is relaxed (for instance by
assuming that n < m), then a continuum of different buyers purchase
from the same producer, and the market shares can be analyzed using
the results in Section 3.
The specific form of function F depends on the distributions of indi-
vidual and firm characteristics. As previously, we illustrate our approach
by explicitly solving this problem for a particular choice of measures.
Let µ be the uniform measure (normalized to have total mass 1) on
the disk
∑n
i=1 (xi − ai)2 ≤ 1 and let ν be the uniform measure (again
normalized to have total mass 1) on the disk
∑n
i=1 (yi − bi)2 ≤ 1 with
16In fact, the restriction of x to the positive orthant is not essential, since the twist
condition holds for all x in the complement of the coordinate hyperplanes xi = 0.
The latter form a set of measure zero which it is always possible to omit, as in
[Chiappori, McCann & Nesheim (2010)].
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ai, bi > 1, i = 1, ..., n. Then the support of the stable measure is born
by the function F = (F1, ..., Fn):
yi = Fi (x) = xi − ai + bi
Agent x then buys the product z such that:
zi = xi (xi − ai + bi)
and firm y produces the product z such that:
zi = (ai − bi + yi) yi
Utilities are derived as before:
∂u
∂xi
(x) =
∂s
∂xi
(x, F (x))
=xi (xi − ai + bi)
therefore
u (x) = K +
n∑
i=1
(
x3i
3
− ai − bi
2
x2i
)
and similarly
v (y) = K ′ +
1
6
n∑
i=1
(ai − bi + yi)3
with K +K ′ = 0.
The hedonic price satisfies:
inf
y
(v (y) + c (y, z)) ≥ P (z) ≥ sup
x
(U (x, z)− u (x))
which gives:
P (z) = −K + 1
12
n∑
i=1
[(
(ai − bi)2 + 4zi
) 3
2 + (ai − bi)
(
(ai − bi)2 + 6zi
)]
.
As usual in a quasi-linear framework (i.e. in the absence of income
effects), the price schedule is defined up to an additive constant K; the
latter can be pinned down, for instance, by imposing conditions on the
profit of the least productive firm.
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6 Conclusion
This paper provides a general characterization of multidimensional match-
ing models, in terms of existence, uniqueness and qualitative properties
of stable matches. We show that recent developments in the litera-
ture on multidimensional optimal transport can be exploited to derive
conditions under which stable matches are unique and pure, and to un-
derstand their local geometry. We consider a first application of such
models to a competitive version of a standard, hedonic model in which
heterogeneous consumers purchase differentiated commodities from het-
erogeneous producers.
Of specific interest are situations in which the dimensions of hetero-
geneity on the two sides of the market are unequal. We explore the
topology of the ‘indifference sets’ that arise in this setting, and provide
conditions under which they can be expected to be smooth manifolds of
dimension m − n. In particular, we investigate the set of ‘multi-to-one
dimensional matching problems’, and we introduce a nestedness crite-
rion under which the equilibrium match can be found more or less ex-
plicitly. Lastly, we stress the deep relationships that exist between the
multi-to-one dimensional framework and models of competition under
multidimensional asymmetric information, at least in the case of private
values. Considering a competitive variant of the seminal, Rochet-Chone´
(1998) problem, in which goods can be produced by a 1-dimensional,
heterogeneous distribution of producers, rather than a single monopo-
list, we provide a full characterization of the resulting equilibrium price
schedule. In particular, we show that in our competitive framework, and
in contrast to the original monopolist setting, there is never bunching;
that is, consumers of different types always buy goods of different types.
Appendices
Appendix A Verification of Examples 1 and 2
We begin with Proposition 21.
Proof. We verify that for each (p, x) ∈ (0, 1)×(1/2, 1), there is a unique
y ∈ (1/2, 1) splitting the population proportionally at (p, x); the result
then follows from Corollary 18.
The proportionally splitting level curves X(y, k(y)) take the form
xy(p) = 1 − y + K(y)
p
, where K(y) is chosen to satisfy the population
splitting condition. Consider now the way that the curves X(y, k(y))
intersect the boundary; as each p 7→ xy(p) is continuous on (0, 1) and
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monotone decreasing (note that K(y) = (x + y − 1)p ≥ 0), it intersects
either [0, 1]×{1/2} in a unique point (p, x) = (p(y), 1/2) or {1}× [1/2, 1]
in a unique point (p, x) = (1, x(y)). We will prove the following two
properties:
1. K(y) is monotone increasing in y.
2. The boundary intersection points have a certain monotonicity prop-
erty. Precisely, for each y0 < y1, one of the following occurs:
(a) X(y0, k(y0)) intersects [0, 1] × {1/2} and X(y1, k(y1)) inter-
sects {1} × [1/2, 1].
(b) X(y0, k(y0)) and X(y1, k(y1)) both intersect [0, 1]×{1/2}, and
p(y0) < p(y1).
(c) X(y0, k(y0)) and X(y1, k(y1)) both intersect {1}×[1/2, 1], and
x(y0) < x(y1).
These two facts will imply the desired result as follows: 1) will imply
that xy1(p)−xy0(p) is decreasing in p, for fixed y0 < y1, as the derivative
of this function is xy1(p)− xy0(p) = K(y0)−K(y1)
p2
< 0. This means that if
two of the population splitting curves intersect, (that is xy1(p¯)−xy0(p¯) =
0) within the given domain, then xy1(p) < xy0(p) for all p > p¯. This in
turn implies that the boundary intersection points satisfy one of the
following:
a) X(y1, k(y1)) intersects [0, 1]×{1/2} and X(y0, k(y0)) intersects {1}×
[1/2, 1].
b) X(y0, k(y0)) andX(y1, k(y1)) both intersect [0, 1]×{1/2}, and p(y0) >
p(y1).
c) X(y0, k(y0)) andX(y1, k(y1)) both intersect {1}×[1/2, 1], and x(y0) >
x(y1).
This clearly contradicts point 2) above and so establishes the desired
result.
To complete the proof, then, it remains only to verify points 1) and
2). We first consider population splitting curves which pass through
[0, 1]× {1/2}. In this case, the proportional splitting condition is given
by
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y − 0.5 =
∫ 1
0.5
p(y)(x¯+ y − 1)
(x+ y − 1) dx
= (x¯+ y − 1)p(y)[ln(1 + y − 1)− ln(0.5 + y − 1)]]
= (y − 0.5)p(y) ln( y
y − 0.5).
This means that p(y) = 1
ln( y
y−0.5 )
. A simple calculation shows that this
function is increasing in y. The function can also be inverted to obtain
y(p) = e
1
p
2(e
1
p−1)
; this tells us that the population splitting level curves
pass through [0, 1]× {1/2} precisely for y ≤ y(1) = e
2(e−1) . For y in this
region, the monotonicity of p(y) implies that 2) b) holds, and we note
that K(y) = y−1/2
ln( y
y−1/2 )
, which is also montone increasing, verifying 1) in
this region.
Therefore, for y ≥ e
2(e−1) , the curve X(y, k(y)) intersects {1} ×
[1/2, 1]. This confirms part 2) a); to complete the proof, it remains
only to show that x(y) and K(y) are monotone increasing on [ e
2(e−1) , 1].
In this region, the proportional splitting condition gives us:
1− y=
∫ 1
x(y)
1− 1(x(y) + y − 1)
(x+ y − 1) dx
= 1− x(y)− (x(y) + y − 1)[ln(1 + y − 1)− ln(x(y) + y − 1)
or, equivalently, x(y) is the unique solution in [0.5, 1] of
0 = f(x, y) := x− y + (x+ y − 1) ln( y
x+ y − 1). (39)
Differentiating implicitly, we have
x′(y) = −fy
fx
. (40)
We have, for x < 1
fx = 1 + ln(
y
x+ y − 1)− 1 = ln(
y
x+ y − 1) > 0
(as, for x < 1, y
x+y−1 > 1).
We now show fy < 0. We have
fy = −2 + ln( y
x+ y − 1) +
x+ y − 1
y
. (41)
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Now, as x ≤ 1, the last term satisfies
x+ y − 1
y
≤ 1 (42)
(with equality only when x = 1), and the second to last term is decreas-
ing in y, so it is less than its value at y = e
2(e−1) :
ln(
y
x+ y − 1)≤ ln(
e
2(e− 1))− ln(
e
2(e− 1) + x− 1) (43)
≤ ln( e
2(e− 1))− ln(
e
2(e− 1) −
1
2
) (44)
= 1, (45)
where the second inequality follows, as x ≥ 1
2
. Note that we have equality
above only if y = e
2(e−1) and x =
1
2
.
Now note that one of the equalities (42) or (45) is always strict (as
either x < 1 or x > 1
2
). Therefore, the derivative (41) is negative on the
relevant range.
As fy < 0 and fx > 0, (40) tells us x
′(y) > 0. Finally, we have
K(y) = x(y) + y − 1, and so the monotonicity of x(y) tells us K(y) is
also strictly increasing on this region.
Finally, we turn our attention to uniform measures on [0, 1] and
[0, 1]2, and the proof of formula (38) in Section 5.1.4. The proof re-
quires the following Lemma.
Lemma 23 Assume µ is uniform on [0, 1]2 and ν is uniform on [0, 1].
If (p, x, y) is in the support of the optimal matching γ, and p > 0 then
either x ≥ 1
2
and y ≥ 1
2
or x ≤ 1
2
and y ≤ 1
2
.
Proof. Note that s(p, 1 − x, 1 − y) − s(p, x, y) = 2 − x − y exhibits no
interaction terms. As the measures are symmetric under the transfoma-
tion (p, x)→ (p, 1−x) and y → 1− y, the (unique) stable matching will
be symmetric under the transformation (p, x, y)→ (p, 1− x, 1− y).
Now, let (p, x, y) belong to the support of γ; then, by invariance,
we must also have (p, 1 − x, 1 − y) in the support of γ. Applying 2 s
monotonicity to these points yields
s(p, x, y) + s(p, 1− x, 1− y) ≥ s(p, 1− x, y) + s(p, x, 1− y).
Now note that for fixed p, the function (x, y) 7→ s(x, y, p) satisfies the
Spence-Mirrlees condition, ∂
2s
∂x∂y
= p
2
> 0. This implies(
x− (1− x))(y − (1− y)) = (2x− 1)(2y − 1) ≥ 0
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which is equivalent to the stated result.
We now prove formula (38) in Section 5.1.4.
Proof. By the preceding Lemma, the optimal map maps the region
[0, 1] × [1
2
, 1] to [1
2
, 1] and [0, 1] × [0, 1
2
] to [0, 1
2
]. The map in the first
region then must be given by G(p, x) = f(p, x), and the mapping in the
second region is G(p, x) = 1− f(p, 1− x) by symmetry.
Appendix B Proof of no bunching
Here we prove the no bunching result, Theorem 22, for our competitive
variant of Rochet and Chone´’s screening model.
Proof. We prove that x 6= x¯ always buy different goods. Let y and y¯ be
the buyers they match with, respectively, and assume that x and x¯ both
buy the good z (from y and y¯ respectively). We will show this implies
x = x¯.
We have that z = yx = y¯x¯.
As (x, y) and (x¯, y¯) belong to the support of the optimal measure γ,
they satisfy the 2-monotonicity condition:
s(x, y) + s(x¯, y¯) ≥ s(x, y¯) + s(x¯, y)
Now, we have that s(x, y) = x · z − 1
2y
|z|2, s(x¯, y¯) = x¯ · z − 1
2y¯
|z|2
and s(x, y¯) ≥ x · z− 1
2y¯
|z|2, s(x¯, y) ≥ x¯ · z− 1
2y
|z|2. Substituting into the
above equation yields:
x·z− 1
2y
|z|2+x¯·z− 1
2y¯
|z|2 ≥ s(x, y¯)+s(x¯, y) ≥ x·z− 1
2y¯
|z|2+x¯·z− 1
2y
|z|2
The right and left hand side are identical, so we must have equality
throughout. In particular, we have that
s(x¯, y) = x¯ · z − 1
2y
|z|2.
This implies z = yx¯ (as z maximizes the joint surplus for y and x¯). But
we also have z = yx from above. Therefore
yx¯ = yx.
Canceling the y gives the desired result.
Appendix C Figures
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Figure 1b: Isohusband curves for y = :6; :7; :8
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Figure 2a: Isohusband curves for y = :2; :3; :4 and :6; :7; :8
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optimal match. Specifically, we use the symmetry embedded in the
model to show that the optimal map is given by:
G (p, x) =
{
F (p, x) if x > 1/2,
1− F (p, 1− x) if x < 1/2, (38)
where F is as in the preceding Proposition. This solution displays a
discontinuity along the line x = 1
2
; each wife (p, 1
2
) with income x = 1
2
is
indifferent between two distinct husbands, one richer (y = e
1
p
2(e
1
p−1)
) and
the other poorer (y = 1− e
1
p
2(e
1
p−1)
= e
1
p−2
2(e
1
p−1)
). Although the total surplus
generated by the latter marriage is smaller, her share of it remains the
same.
We have also numerically solved this case; the resulting solution
agrees with our theoretical solution and is graphed below.
Figure 2b: Numerically generated iso-husband curves when both 
men’s income and women’s fertility and income uniformly distributed. 
The horizontal and vertical axes represent the fertility and income of 
women, respectively. The curves are iso-husband curves; that is, level 
curves of the matching function F (p, x).
5.1.5 Example 3: anticorrelated marginals
In this case, the analytic solution is very complicated, and we provide
only a numerical simulation. For  = 0 the numerical solution is plot-
ted below; one interesting feature is that lower income men (whose iso-
husband curves lie in the green, yellow or orange regions) are indifferent
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between a selection of wives in both the low fertility, high income regime,
[0, 1
2
]× [3
4
, 1], and the high fertility, low income region [1
2
, 1]× [1
2
, 3
4
+ ],
whereas the highest income men, whose iso-husband curves lie in the
dark red region, match exclusively with wives in the high fertility, low
income regime. This model does not fit the hypotheses of Theorem 16
when  = 0, since X is neither connected nor Lipschitz, but this short-
coming can be rectified by taking  > 0 arbitarily small.
Figure 3: Numerically generated iso-husband curves when women’s fer-
tility and income are anti-correlated. The horizontal and vertical axes 
represent the fertility and income of women, respectively. The curves 
are iso-husband curves; that is, level curves of the matching function 
F (p, x).
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